Dhaka 2:57 pm, Friday, 19 June 2026

Why Turkey and Israel Are at Odds Over Somaliland ?

Staff Correspondent:
  • Update Time : 06:01:20 am, Tuesday, 3 February 2026
  • / 264 Time View

Israel’s interest in Somaliland has grown at a time when the Suez Canal route for cargo ships heading to Israel has become largely restricted. According to analyst Amichai Stein, another key objective is to counter Turkey’s expanding influence in Africa.

Turkey already maintains military facilities in the region. Alongside Ankara, the United Arab Emirates also operates bases there, while several other countries are seeking a foothold along this strategically vital commercial corridor.

Clashing Regional Interests

Relations between Turkey and Israel have deteriorated sharply since 2023. Ankara has accused Israel of committing genocide in Gaza, a claim that led Turkey to impose trade restrictions on Israel last year.

Tensions escalated further after the fall of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad’s government in December. Israel has taken a position in favor of a fragmented Syria, a stance that conflicts with Turkish interests—particularly Ankara’s concerns over Kurdish control in northeastern Syria.

Abdiwahab Sheikh Abdisamad, Executive Director of the Nairobi-based Afro-Asia Institute for Strategic Studies, says Israel’s recognition of Somaliland is likely to intensify rivalry between Turkey and Israel across the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea region.

Turkey has made substantial investments in Somalia. It hosts Turkey’s largest embassy worldwide, a military training academy, and a seaport. Turkish companies also manage Mogadishu’s airport, while Ankara runs projects in energy, trade, space cooperation, and education.

According to Abdisamad, Israel’s move to recognize Somaliland directly undermines Turkey’s geopolitical standing. It allows Israel to strengthen its position on both sides of the Bab el-Mandeb Strait while pushing back against Turkish influence.

Local media reports indicate that Turkey and Somalia have long discussed building another military base in the Las Qoray area—a port town in the newly declared Khatumo state that offers direct access to the Red Sea. Khatumo overlaps with about 45 percent of the territory claimed by Somaliland.

Kani Torun, Turkey’s former ambassador to Somalia from 2011 to 2014, revealed that Ankara and Mogadishu once reached a verbal agreement to establish a base and a nearby small port in the area, though the plan was never implemented.

On December 26, Israel officially recognized Somaliland as an independent and sovereign state. Four days later, during a joint press conference in Ankara with Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan described the move as “illegal and unacceptable.”

On January 6, Israeli Foreign Minister Gideon Sa’ar visited Somaliland—the first high-level Israeli diplomat to do so. In Hargeisa, he met with President Abdirahman Mohamed Abdullahi.

The question now is where this growing diplomatic confrontation between Turkey and Israel will ultimately lead.

Tag :

Please Share This Post in Your Social Media

Why Turkey and Israel Are at Odds Over Somaliland ?

Update Time : 06:01:20 am, Tuesday, 3 February 2026

Israel’s interest in Somaliland has grown at a time when the Suez Canal route for cargo ships heading to Israel has become largely restricted. According to analyst Amichai Stein, another key objective is to counter Turkey’s expanding influence in Africa.

Turkey already maintains military facilities in the region. Alongside Ankara, the United Arab Emirates also operates bases there, while several other countries are seeking a foothold along this strategically vital commercial corridor.

Clashing Regional Interests

Relations between Turkey and Israel have deteriorated sharply since 2023. Ankara has accused Israel of committing genocide in Gaza, a claim that led Turkey to impose trade restrictions on Israel last year.

Tensions escalated further after the fall of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad’s government in December. Israel has taken a position in favor of a fragmented Syria, a stance that conflicts with Turkish interests—particularly Ankara’s concerns over Kurdish control in northeastern Syria.

Abdiwahab Sheikh Abdisamad, Executive Director of the Nairobi-based Afro-Asia Institute for Strategic Studies, says Israel’s recognition of Somaliland is likely to intensify rivalry between Turkey and Israel across the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea region.

Turkey has made substantial investments in Somalia. It hosts Turkey’s largest embassy worldwide, a military training academy, and a seaport. Turkish companies also manage Mogadishu’s airport, while Ankara runs projects in energy, trade, space cooperation, and education.

According to Abdisamad, Israel’s move to recognize Somaliland directly undermines Turkey’s geopolitical standing. It allows Israel to strengthen its position on both sides of the Bab el-Mandeb Strait while pushing back against Turkish influence.

Local media reports indicate that Turkey and Somalia have long discussed building another military base in the Las Qoray area—a port town in the newly declared Khatumo state that offers direct access to the Red Sea. Khatumo overlaps with about 45 percent of the territory claimed by Somaliland.

Kani Torun, Turkey’s former ambassador to Somalia from 2011 to 2014, revealed that Ankara and Mogadishu once reached a verbal agreement to establish a base and a nearby small port in the area, though the plan was never implemented.

On December 26, Israel officially recognized Somaliland as an independent and sovereign state. Four days later, during a joint press conference in Ankara with Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan described the move as “illegal and unacceptable.”

On January 6, Israeli Foreign Minister Gideon Sa’ar visited Somaliland—the first high-level Israeli diplomat to do so. In Hargeisa, he met with President Abdirahman Mohamed Abdullahi.

The question now is where this growing diplomatic confrontation between Turkey and Israel will ultimately lead.